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Globally, the response to human trafficking has moved up the political agenda. The 
prime minister of the United Kingdom has referred to it as “the greatest human 
rights issue of our time”, which demands a response outside the constraints of 
politics. This is particularly the case in relation to conflict, where an additional 
urgency arises from people being forced into sexual slavery or combat. However, 
even in these contexts, political agendas are not abandoned and the response to 
trafficking comes second to other priorities, such as combatting violent extremism. 
The result is initiatives that don’t directly engage with the problem, and are thus 
not appropriately targeted. This article discusses the motives that have brought 
human trafficking in conflict to the attention of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC). By developing a typology of the different forms of trafficking present 
in conflict-affected contexts, it calls for a more nuanced response that engages 
with the dynamics of trafficking.
In December 2016, after an open debate, 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
adopted resolution 2331 condemning 
human trafficking in conflict. This is a laud-
able response to what has been described 
as “the greatest human rights issue of our 
time” and a “crime against humanity” (Davies 
2014; May 2016). The open debate before 
the resolution was passed was one of the 
liveliest, with more than 70 speakers mak-
ing statements (UN 2016a). The resultant 
emphasis on human trafficking in conflict 
will undoubtedly benefit those vulnerable 
to trafficking. However, the timing of the 
resolution and its focus on violent extrem-
ist groups raises questions on the motives 
of member states — is this a move to protect 
potential victims or another tool to tackle 
violent extremism? Both of these activities 
are important in the current climate, but by 
merging them the focus becomes on a partic-
ular type of human trafficking, while failing 
to acknowledge other forms of exploitation 
common in conflict-affected states that fit 
the definition of human trafficking. The risk 
is that energy is focused on pursuing perpe-
trators of human trafficking as defined by 
the resolution, not those involved in other 
forms of exploitation. This article sets out a 
typology of human trafficking in conflict and 
calls for a broader response.
A Question of Motives
With the UN Security Council adopting res-
olution 2331 in December 2016, the link 
between human trafficking and conflict has 
gained widespread recognition and calls for 
action. The timing of the resolution was per-
tinent — it was a strong statement against the 
stability
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practices of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)1 primarily, but also other violent 
extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, Al 
Shabaab and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
The kidnap, sale and trade in persons by 
ISIL, particularly Yazidi’s and other minor-
ity groups, has been condemned by the UN 
Special Representative on sexual violence 
in conflict (UN 2016b). However, the use 
of sexual slavery in conflict is not unprec-
edented. The most prominent case is the use 
of ‘comfort women’ by the Japanese military 
during World War II. These previous cases 
suggest that there is more at play regard-
ing the current attention to human traffick-
ing and conflict. Aside from condemning 
practices of slavery, the resolution also 
denounces ISIL and its practices, along with 
those of other violent extremist or terrorist 
groups. This is evident throughout the reso-
lution, particularly as it references human 
trafficking as an “instrument to increase 
[ISIL’s] finances and their power through 
recruitment and the destruction of commu-
nities” (UN 2016c).
The combination of human trafficking and 
other priorities is not dissimilar to the draft-
ing of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons. Kotiswaran 
(2017: 3) highlights that although human 
trafficking, primarily in the form of sex traf-
ficking, had long been addressed by states 
“this traditional concern converged with 
several developed states” interests in stem-
ming illegal international labour migration 
to create a criminal law regime against “traf-
ficking”. Although the Protocol focused on 
preventing and punishing trafficking as well 
as protecting victims, the language related to 
criminality is more positive, whereas states 
should “endeavour to” ensure protection “to 
the extent possible” (UN 2000).
Similarly, in the UNSC resolution, pro-
tecting victims comes fourth in the call to 
member states after the ratification of inter-
national instruments on human trafficking; 
action to prevent, criminalise, investigate, 
prosecute and ensure accountability of those 
engaged in trafficking of persons; and the 
investigation, disruption and dismantling of 
networks involved in trafficking (UN 2016c). 
The investigation and disruption of crimi-
nal actors is much easier for state parties 
to do, particularly as victim support can be 
lengthy and expensive. But in this context, 
it emphasises the importance of undermin-
ing the value of human trafficking to violent 
extremist groups. The result is a security-
focused approach that targets the groups 
responsible.
Regardless of the emphasis on the security 
aspects of human trafficking by UN member 
states, several organisations have responded 
with enthusiasm, providing recommenda-
tions to the UN on how to respond. UN 
University in partnership with the Permanent 
Missions of the UK and Liechtenstein to the 
UN, organised a workshop to identify ideas 
for action from the Security Council (UNU 
2016). The Freedom Fund also released 
a report with recommendations for the 
Security Council (Freedom Fund 2016). Both 
of these reports were released prior to the 
open debate and the adoption of the reso-
lution. Both reports engage with high level 
strategies, such as the ratification of conven-
tions and the pursuit of networks and finan-
cial flows. However, they approach the issue 
from different angles, engaging with the 
exploitation that arises as a result of human 
trafficking.
The Freedom Fund identifies human traf-
ficking in conflict as one of the worst forms 
of exploitation, and highlights the “danger 
that the high-level discussions in interna-
tional capitals will fail to translate into real 
protection and accountability for the most 
vulnerable” (Freedom Fund 2016: 20). This 
reiterates the need for protection of, and 
support for victims of trafficking.
While the Freedom Fund seeks to shift the 
emphasis back to those being trafficked, the 
debate has focused on human trafficking in 
conflict as a singular phenomenon. Even if 
the focus moves onto victims, the result will 
likely be a singular response. Human traf-
ficking, and particularly human trafficking in 
conflict-affected areas encompasses a wide 
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variation in the dynamics of trafficking. This 
article seeks to unpack the different forms 
of trafficking present in conflict-affected 
contexts, developing a typology of human 
trafficking.
Some organisations advocating for action 
on human trafficking have already identi-
fied different categories. For instance, UN 
University disaggregates between human 
trafficking within and into conflict-affected 
areas, child recruitment, and human traffick-
ing from conflict-affected areas (UNU 2016). 
This article seeks to go further, deepening 
the analysis on the form of exploitation and 
the level of agency of trafficking victims. 
Only by understanding the nuances of differ-
ent forms of trafficking can action respond-
ing to it be targeted.
A Typology of Slavery
Because the drivers of each form of slavery 
are multi-faceted, any response needs to 
engage with the specific of that type of slav-
ery, as well as the different drivers. The forms 
of exploitation that are present in conflict 
have varying levels of control, agency and 
exploitation, and different perpetrators. The 
nature of conflict also changes the dynamics 
of agency, with many individuals willing to 
take risks that may result in their exploita-
tion to escape an even worse reality. These 
nuances mean that the same strategy is 
not applicable to all forms of exploitation. 
The table below sketches out a typology of 
human trafficking in conflict, breaking down 
the different elements of each form. Each 
form is then discussed in more detail.
Type Control Agency Exploitation Perpetrators
Migration 
away from 
conflict/ 
political 
violence
Migrants rely 
on smugglers/ 
traffickers for their 
transportation, 
and experience 
varied levels of 
control.
Choose to travel, 
but vulnerable 
because of 
irregular status.
Extortion
Sexual abuse
Forced/exploitative 
labour
Organ harvesting.
Network of 
smugglers, 
traffickers.
Host communities.
Sex 
trafficking 
into conflict
Held in secure 
locations, difficult 
to leave.
Some may be 
openly recruited, 
others deceived 
with false offers 
of employment.
Sexual abuse, forced 
sexual exploitation.
Trafficking 
networks; UN 
missions; soldiers.
Trafficking 
from 
refugee/IDP 
camps
Varies — often held 
in secure locations 
in destination, such 
as brothels. Risk of 
debt bondage.
Desperate to 
leave — often 
deception/
false offers of 
employment.
End up in 
exploitative labour/ 
forced sexual 
exploitation.
Trafficking 
network.
Kidnapping 
to sell
Held by armed 
groups and sold on.
Kidnapped. May be abused 
by armed groups. 
When sold treated 
as slaves.
Armed groups.
Kidnapping 
for forced 
labour/ 
combat
Held by armed 
groups. Violent 
initiation that ties 
to group. Threats if 
attempt to leave.
Kidnapped. Some 
handed over 
by families for 
survival or out of 
fear.
Forced labour — 
porters, cooks etc.
Child soldiers.
Armed groups.
(contd.)
Jesperson: Conflict and MigrationArt. 4, page 4 of 13
Human trafficking is complex, multifac-
eted and strongly tied to broader migra-
tory flows. People smuggling has become a 
lucrative trade for organised crime groups 
moving people to safety. However, the 
involvement of organised crime groups 
has blurred the division between consen-
sual, often paid for, irregular migration 
which exists at one end of a spectrum, and 
coercive or exploitative migration linked 
to human trafficking and slavery, which 
exists at the other. While conflict is push-
ing people into migration, migration is also 
creating tensions at migratory hubs, which 
makes migrants vulnerable to exploitation. 
The result is that individuals move in and 
out of categories linked to human traffick-
ing or people smuggling as they move from 
their country of origin to their destination. 
The blurred distinctions between different 
categories is discussed below, considering 
the linkage with conflict — whether con-
flict is a push factor, a result of migration 
flows, or a hub of exploitative practices. 
The exploitative and coercive end of the 
migratory spectrum will be probed in more 
depth, looking at the implications for vic-
tims of trafficking or exploitation and how 
the current response to migration responds 
to their needs.
Conflict as a Driver for Migration
Although not the sole driver, conflict and 
political violence are widely recognised as a 
major factor in migratory flows, particularly 
in the main migratory routes into Europe 
over recent years. During 2017, the top ten 
countries of origin for irregular arrivals into 
Europe via the Mediterranean were Syria, 
Nigeria, Guinea, Cote D’Ivoire, Morocco, 
Bangladesh, Gambia, Mali, Iraq and Algeria 
(UNHCR 2018).
Migration flows into Europe from West 
Africa are less affected by conflict and 
political violence. These flows tend to be 
dominated by economic migrants and traf-
ficking victims. The distinction between 
these is blurred; economic migration can 
be exploitative, and migrants are engaging 
in ‘survival sex’ and other activities to fund 
their journey. Also, while migration may 
appear to be driven by economic factors, 
there are often multiple drivers involved 
— some of which are linked to structural 
violence.
While some people are fleeing instability, 
such as the conflicts in northeast Nigeria 
and northern Mali, this is not the majority. 
For example, trafficking from Nigeria pri-
marily originates in Edo State in southern 
Nigeria, with women and girls recruited into 
sex work in Italy, Spain and other European 
countries. In contrast, although East Africa 
has some economic migration, the primary 
source has been Eritrea, where young men 
are avoiding conscription and political vio-
lence. The majority of recent flows however, 
originated in Syria, which remains the high-
est source of migration arising from people 
fleeing conflict.
Type Control Agency Exploitation Perpetrators
Kidnapping 
for sexual 
slavery
Held by armed 
groups. Threats if 
attempt to leave.
Kidnapped. Sexual slavery. Armed groups 
(targeting of 
particular groups, 
e.g. Yazidi, 
Christian as tactic 
of war).
Forced/ 
underage 
marriage
Can be tantamount 
to handing over 
ownership.
Family see 
as form of 
protection. 
Cultural practice.
Sexual abuse; 
limitations on 
freedom; ‘menace 
of penalty’ if 
not behaving 
appropriately.
Families.
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Schmidt (2016) predicts that the balance 
between conflict and political violence or 
economic and environmental migration is 
likely to change as a result of climate change 
and globalisation. For instance, some predic-
tions suggest that the Nigerian population 
will increase from 180 million to over 300 
million by 2050, and the country is already 
facing serious economic and environmen-
tal pressures (UN 2017). As this pressure 
increases, more people are likely to find a 
way out. But conflict remains a major driver.
A deeper look at the regions feeding migra-
tion reveals that the role of conflict and polit-
ical violence is likely to worsen. Although 
the relationship between the Ethiopian and 
Eritrean governments has normalised since 
late 2018, with forced conscription in Eritrea 
officially ended, political instability in Sudan 
has increased outward flows, and conflict in 
South Sudan has worsened.
Insurgency in Northern Nigeria continues 
despite government pronouncements that 
Boko Haram has been pushed back. Military 
campaigns in 2015 and 2016 had some suc-
cess, but there was a resurgence of attacks 
in 2018 as a new faction — Islamic State 
West Africa Province — gained prominence 
(Maclean 2018). This has affected neighbour-
ing countries, including Chad and Cameroon 
as well as North-eastern Nigeria (Reuters 
2019). Violence also continues in Mali; con-
flict escalated throughout 2018 with hun-
dreds of civilians killed, and violence spilling 
into neighbouring countries. In March 2019, 
over 157 Fulani villagers were killed in a mas-
sacre in Mopti; attacks have continued, with 
two attacks killing 18 civilians at the begin-
ning of May 2019 (Reuters 2019). 
This is not even considering Syria or 
Afghanistan, where people continue to leave. 
Despite several ceasefire attempts in Syria, 
2017 was still particularly violent, with some 
estimates putting the death toll at 10,204 
(SN4HR 2018). The first half of 2017 was 
also deadly in Afghanistan, with the highest 
rate of civilian deaths since the war began 
(Rasmussen 2017). In response, many civil-
ians continue to seek safety elsewhere.
What does this have to do with 
human trafficking?
People have always fled conflict. The UNHCR 
Global Trends Report 2015 revealed that 
over the last 20 years, displacement has con-
sistently been above 30 million people each 
year (UNHCR 2016). The majority of these 
are displaced internally, but the numbers 
seeking refuge in other countries has rarely 
dipped below 15 million per year (UNHCR 
2016). However, the number of displaced 
persons has continued to rise, reaching a 
peak in 2016/17 of 65.6 million people forci-
bly displaced (UNHCR 2017).
With that many people on the move, the 
risk of exploitation also increases. Since the 
European migration crisis began in 2014, 
there have been numerous stories of ‘human-
itarian smugglers’. Farrell (2015) interviewed 
Abu Rabih in Izmir, Turkey, where he charges 
US$1200 to transport migrants to Greece. A 
Palestinian-Syrian, who left his life as a trader 
in Damascus because of the war, Rabih col-
lects money from migrants and coordinates 
their lodging and transport from a beach 
near Izmir in rubber dinghies to Lesbos. 
Rabih himself makes US$200 per person, 
with the remainder paying for the vessel, 
engine, various middle men including bus 
drivers, low level smugglers and translators, 
and higher-level Turkish mafia networks that 
pay off law enforcement to keep the police 
away from the beaches (Global Initiative 
2015). Although Rabih sees his role as 
humanitarian — assisting refugees in getting 
to their desired destination — the increasing 
role of organised crime networks higher up 
the chain has become increasingly promi-
nent given the amount of money that can 
be made. Although some migrants are able 
to pay, or work until they can, some groups 
engage in further exploitation to maximise 
their profits.
Many people pay for their journey as they 
move from one segment to the next, seeking 
to work along the way to raise money for the 
next segment. This makes them vulnerable 
to exploitation, as irregular migrants they 
have few avenues for recourse if something 
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goes wrong. There are numerous reports of 
migrants engaging in survival sex, which has 
been documented in many transit countries, 
from Niger to Greece.
Another trend that has emerged is organ 
harvesting. An Eritrean smuggler that 
became a state witness revealed that migrants 
unable to pay for their journey were sold for 
€15,000 to Egyptian groups that removed 
and sold organs (Williams 2016). This has 
been substantiated by the discovery of mass 
graves in the Sinai.
Although trafficking in the Sinai has 
decreased following a crackdown by 
Egyptian authorities, organ harvesting 
continues. There are also reports from law 
enforcement that smugglers increase the 
price once migrants reach Libya, offering 
organ harvesting as a way to pay the differ-
ence if their families can’t send additional 
funds.2 This is not limited to people fleeing 
conflict.
From the Horn of Africa, many migrants 
have also worked in gold mines in Sudan, 
Chad and Libya to pay for their journey. They 
have very little control over the conditions 
they are working in, and may become fur-
ther indebted to their ‘employer’ if they are 
provided with food and accommodation, but 
do not find any gold (Molenaar, Tubiana and 
Warin 2018).
In West Africa, Agadez in Niger has long 
been a migration hub, with migrants from 
all over the region passing through on their 
way to the Mediterranean coast. A long-
standing industry of transportation and 
hotels has been created to service these 
flows. However, the rule of law vacuum that 
has opened in Libya creates many more 
risks for migrants. From Agadez, if migrants 
can’t pay for the next leg of their journey, 
they are transported as cargo, with many 
reports that they are sold once in Libya 
(Graham-Harrison 2017). Even for those 
that have paid, there is no guarantee that 
their smugglers will not also sell them for 
extra cash, and because they are travelling 
illegally once they cross the Libyan border, 
there is no avenue for recourse.
Migration, particularly that driven by con-
flict and political violence — where people 
need to leave when they can, not when they 
have enough resources — places them at risk 
of exploitation at the hand of organised crime 
groups. These forms of exploitation begin to 
fit into definitions of trafficking, even though 
the migrants are willing, because of the decep-
tion and exploitation involved. But these types 
of exploitation are rarely considered in discus-
sions of conflict and human trafficking.
Conflict making people Vulnerable to 
Trafficking
The forms of exploitation discussed so far 
have been indirect to conflict, but a result of 
people fleeing conflict. Conflict also makes 
people vulnerable to trafficking — both into, 
and away from conflict zones.
The Bosnian war was notorious for women 
being trafficked into a war zone for sexual 
exploitation (see Mendelson 2005; HRW 
2002; Smith and Miller-de la Cuesta 2011). 
Although there were never any prosecu-
tions, girls from Romania, Ukraine, Moldova 
and other Eastern European countries were 
brought in to service the UN and military 
bases as sex slaves. Cases that were investi-
gated by the International Police Taskforce 
involved officers from the US, Pakistan, 
Germany, Romania, Ukraine, government 
officials and criminal groups. Investigations 
were blocked, suspects were removed from 
missions and transferred, and victims were 
returned to their home countries.
At the time, “human trafficking” was not 
a widely used term. The majority of officers 
thought the women were merely prostitutes, 
but many had been trafficked for that pur-
pose. This was not an isolated case. A number 
of UN missions came under scrutiny, includ-
ing those in Sierra Leone and Uganda. Save 
the Children released a report in 2006 on UN 
peacekeepers in Liberia who had exchanged 
food for sex with girls aged 8 to18 years 
(Washington Times 2006).
In the 1990s and early 2000s there was 
a surge of UN missions in conflict-affected 
states; training was often inadequate and 
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procedures weren’t in place to ensure due 
process. However, sexual exploitation by 
UN missions continues to this day despite 
the negative coverage. In 2016, MINUSCA, 
the UN mission in Central African Republic 
came under scrutiny for sexual abuse. For 
example, officers involved in a mission 
focused on the protection of civilians were 
accused of abusing 108 women and children 
in one province between 2013 and 2015 
(Benn 2016).
Although a number of procedures have 
been put in place to prevent abuse and 
punish those involved, MINUSCA revealed 
that UN missions continue to make civil-
ians vulnerable to exploitation, particularly 
sexual abuse.
Women and children in refugee and IDP 
(Internally Displaced Persons) camps are 
also susceptible to human traffickers. Often 
at risk of, or subject to abuse in camps, offers 
of ‘employment’ elsewhere are very attrac-
tive. Although Benin City is renowned as 
the hub for human trafficking from Nigeria, 
there are reports of recruitment also occur-
ring in Maiduguri (Vanguard 2017). Many 
women and girls have already been engag-
ing in survival sex to support themselves. 
They are aware that the employment in 
Italy is likely to be sex work, but it is prefer-
able to the uncertainty of the region, and 
they believe they can use it as a jumping off 
point to something else.
Conflict groups facilitating human 
trafficking
Conflict groups have also directly contrib-
uted to human trafficking. Many conflict 
groups, particularly those engaged in kid-
napping, have indicated plans to sell their 
captives on. For instance, following the kid-
nap of over 200 girls from Chibok in north-
ern Nigeria, in a video released online the 
leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, 
threatened to sell the girls, tapping into the 
existing human trafficking network that 
operates from Nigeria (BBC 2014). However, 
as a number of the girls have since been 
freed or have escaped, there is no evidence 
that this happened. Many of the girls have 
been forced into slavery, which is discussed 
below.
For ISIL, women and girls who are held 
as sex slaves are transported to differ-
ent countries in the region. There are also 
cases where captured women and girls have 
been returned to their families in exchange 
for payment (UN 2016b). Although this is 
punishable by death, fighters have sold 
on their slaves. The UN reports that ISIL 
received US$850,000 from Yazidi families 
in exchange for 200 women and girls that 
had been kidnapped, with estimates for 
2014 ranging from 35 to 45 million dollars 
(UN 2016b).
Conflict groups engaging in slavery
Direct involvement in slavery by conflict 
groups has become the most common link 
between conflict and human trafficking, and 
the primary focus of the UN Security Council 
resolution. This is most widely recognised in 
terms of forced recruitment of children — 
whether as soldiers, porters, cooks, lookouts 
or sexual slaves. Conflicts in the 1990s and 
2000s were notorious for the use of child sol-
diers, particularly Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
also the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, 
which was publicised by the Invisible 
Children campaign.
The use of child soldiers continues, but it 
has changed somewhat. Conflict has shifted 
away from civil wars to violent extremism, 
where children continue to play a key role. 
Horgan and Bloom (2016) have documented 
the involvement of children in ISIL — from 
watching beheadings, training for combat, 
distributing weapons, and carrying out exe-
cutions. These children belong to foreigners 
joining ISIL or supportive locals, but they 
also include runaways, abandoned children 
from nearby orphanages and those taken by 
force from their parents.
The difference here from earlier child 
soldiers is the ideological drivers of violent 
extremist groups means that parents often 
consent to their children’s involvement. This 
may be influenced by the pressures of war, 
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such as the need to survive, but it means 
it’s less coercive than earlier conflict groups 
that primarily kidnapped children. Forced 
recruitment of children still occurs, but there 
are many other recruitment methods also, 
and this is not limited to non-state armed 
groups. Ten national governments conscript 
youth into their national armies — Chad, 
Cote D’Ivoire, DRC, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, the UK and Yemen 
(Bloom 2015).
Another form of slavery arises from the 
use of women and girls as sex slaves. This is 
not new either. As discussed earlier, in World 
War II Japanese forces established ‘comfort 
stations’ in occupied territories with women 
and girls abducted or falsely recruited to be 
factory workers or nurses and forced to work 
as prostitutes. The stated aim was to comfort 
soldiers, prevent rape and avoid espionage. 
However, comfort stations were violent and 
coercive (Horn 1997). Enloe (2000) also 
discusses the intersection of military bases 
and prostitution, and the line between pur-
chasing and coercing, which is sometimes 
blurred.
More recently, however, conflict groups 
have been targeting particular groups, part 
of a strategy that resembles the use of rape 
as a weapon of war. It degrades a segment 
of the population and contributes to geno-
cide. ISIL has targeted Yazidi women and 
girls, which has been considered part of a 
genocidal strategy by the UN Human Rights 
Council, with over 3200 women and children 
held by the group. A report presented to the 
Human Rights Council records how organ-
ised slavery is within ISIL:
Captured Yazidi women and girls 
are deemed property of ISIS and are 
openly termed sabaya or slaves. ISIS 
made eighty percent of the women 
and girls available to its fighters for 
individual purchase, the apportioning 
being drawn directly from religious 
interpretation. ISIS sells Yazidi women 
and girls in slave markets, or souk 
sabaya, or as individual purchases to 
fighters who come to the holding cen-
tres. In some instances, an ISIS fighter 
might buy a group of Yazidi females 
in order to take them into rural areas 
without slave markets where he could 
sell them individually at a higher price. 
The remaining twenty percent are held 
as collective property of ISIS and were 
distributed in groups to military bases 
throughout Iraq and Syria (UN HRC 
2016).
Slave markets are organised by the Committee 
for the Buying and Selling of Slaves; informa-
tion about how to participate in ISIL-run slave 
auctions is circulated to ISIL combatants, and 
ISIL troops who control slaves receive a US$50 
stipend per week (UNU 2016).
Forced Marriage and Underage 
Marriage
Related to the use of (mostly) women and 
girls as sex slaves, some conflict groups 
have forced these slaves into marriage. In 
a similar strategy to ISIL, Boko Haram tar-
geted Christian women and girls, kidnap-
ping 276 school girls from Chibok in 2014. 
Many of these girls were forced to marry 
Boko Haram militants. There is reportedly 
a slave hierarchy, where those that refuse 
to marry become slaves of enslaved wives 
(UNU 2016).
This is not the only form of under-age mar-
riage. Nine of the top 10 countries with the 
highest rates of child marriage are fragile 
states. Anti-Slavery International has found 
that the levels of abuse, exploitation and 
control experienced by children through 
early marriage often meet international legal 
definitions of slavery and slavery-like prac-
tices, such as forced labour and trafficking. 
This is particularly the case when employed 
by conflict groups, such as when girls are 
sold to become wives, or kidnapped to be sex 
slaves, which has been the case for both Boko 
Haram and ISIL. In these cases, there are 
clear indicators around ownership, exploita-
tion and the limitations of freedom that have 
a clear link to the definition of slavery.
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In other situations, the link is less clear 
cut. In some instances, families agree to 
early marriage as a form of protection — the 
need to protect girls from rape, pregnancy 
outside of marriage, influence from other 
communities and poverty. This is particu-
larly relevant in situations of conflict and 
fragility, where girls are vulnerable. While 
this still results in human rights viola-
tions, differences arise in the girl’s control 
over or ability to leave the relationship. In 
some cases, the agreement of the family 
for their child to marry is tantamount to 
handing over ownership, allowing exploita-
tion and limitations on the child’s freedom, 
and there may be the ‘menace of penalty’ 
if they do not conduct themselves accord-
ingly, through the use or threat of violence. 
However, this is not always the case.
Overall, child and early marriage can con-
stitute a form of modern slavery, but not in 
every case. It is always a human rights vio-
lation, but differences in the dynamics of 
ownership, exploitation and limitations on 
the child’s freedom affect whether or not it 
is considered slavery.
Only Engaging with Specific Forms
The discussion of the typology of human traf-
ficking in conflict highlights the varied forms 
of exploitation, but also how different strate-
gies would be required to target the diverse 
perpetrators. However, as discussed earlier, 
the UNSC resolution focuses on a particular 
form of human trafficking in conflict. This 
arises from how human trafficking is defined 
by member states.
Currently, human trafficking and modern 
slavery are used somewhat interchangeably.3 
In the UK, modern slavery has been adopted 
as an umbrella term to cover slavery, servi-
tude, forced and compulsory labour and 
human trafficking. The Home Office states 
that “traffickers and slave drivers coerce, 
deceive and force individuals against their 
will into a life of abuse, servitude and inhu-
mane treatment” (HMG 2015). The use of this 
term focuses on the practice of keeping some-
one in slave-like conditions, which suggests a 
victim-centred approach. However, in reality 
the emphasis remains on the ‘slavers’, those 
perpetrating the exploitation.
The US State Department, which uses “traf-
ficking in persons” as their umbrella term, 
claims that
human trafficking can include, but 
does not require, movement. People 
may be considered trafficking vic-
tims regardless of whether they were 
born into a state of servitude, were 
exploited in their home town, were 
transported to the exploitative situa-
tion, previously consented to work for 
a trafficker, or participated in a crime 
as a direct result of being trafficked. 
At the heart of this phenomenon is 
the traffickers’ aim to exploit and 
enslave their victims and the myriad 
coercive and deceptive practices they 
use to do so (US 2018).
Accordingly, the emphasis is primarily on the 
‘means’ of trafficking, rather than the ‘end’ 
result, which is the exploitation. Specific 
forms of trafficking discussed above, such 
as organ trafficking and forced marriage are 
also excluded from the definition.
For the UN Protocol,
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean 
the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of per-
sons, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiv-
ing of payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent of a person having con-
trol over another person, for the pur-
pose of exploitation.
It goes on to state that “exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others or other forms 
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or ser-
vices, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
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servitude or the removal of organs” (UN 
2000). The consent of the trafficking victim 
is considered irrelevant when any of the 
means set out above have been used.
All of these definitions focus on the per-
petrator. They constitute human trafficking 
as a crime that has a clear victim and a clear 
perpetrator. While that may be the case for 
instances of exploitation by armed groups, 
where there is a clear motive to exploit par-
ticular groups, it is not for the other forms 
of exploitation set out in the typology. For 
those forms of exploitation that are clear cut, 
the response is much more closely aligned 
with the response to violent extremism and 
even organised crime — a response that relies 
almost exclusively on security strategies.
The complications raised by agency and 
the lack of a clear perpetrator creates a chal-
lenge for policymakers, as the entry points 
for intervention are not as clear cut as when 
there is a clear security response. But the 
result is a deprioritisation of other forms of 
exploitation, and lack of focus on prevention 
and protection.
Exploitation is inherent in conflict, par-
ticularly contemporary wars which target 
civilians through sporadic attacks. As conflict 
actors increasingly engage in illicit activity to 
fund their activities, there is crossover with 
organised crime, including human traffick-
ing, people smuggling and slavery. This is 
seen as particularly troubling when violent 
extremist groups are involved.
However, the problem with focusing on 
exploitation is it removes the agency of traf-
ficking victims. O’Connell Davidson (2017: 
159–60) points out that the core difference 
between the historical transatlantic slave 
trade and modern slavery is that those con-
sidered trafficking victims “invariably want to 
move, and generally have excellent reasons 
for wishing to do so”, citing research on debt-
financed migration/debt bondage depend-
ing on the viewpoint, where migrants know 
the risks, but consider the potential benefits 
worthwhile. Reitano (2017) also questions 
the focus on exploitation, as in many African 
countries, what is labelled human trafficking 
is “simply a quest for a better life” and “often 
what the international community labels as 
human trafficking are in fact locally accepta-
ble labour practices that offer the only mean-
ingful employment available”. This creates an 
overlap with people smuggling.
The complications raised by agency and 
the lack of a clear perpetrator creates a chal-
lenge for policymakers, as the entry points 
for intervention are not as clear cut as when 
there is a clear security response. But the 
result is a deprioritisation of the categories 
discussed above, and lack of focus on preven-
tion and protection.
Conclusion
The relationship between conflict and 
human trafficking is complex. Conflict and 
political violence remain key drivers for 
migration. There is more agency at this end 
of the migration spectrum. Even though peo-
ple are forced to flee, they are not coerced 
into it. However, they are still vulnerable to 
exploitation, particularly as organised crime 
groups have become more involved. Moving 
along the spectrum to human trafficking and 
slavery, agency decreases with a correspond-
ing increase in the risk of exploitation. This is 
an obvious point. But in the current context, 
it raises two challenges with the approach 
taken by the UNSC resolution.
First, non-state armed groups are often 
disrespectful of international law. If they 
can ever be identified as obeying interna-
tional law, groups defined as violent extrem-
ist make a concerted effort to undermine it 
(Bargerter 2011). While international legal 
strategies may have some value post-con-
flict, when leaders of armed groups may be 
brought to justice, this does nothing to stop 
exploitation occurring.
Second, although practices like the use 
of child soldiers and sex slaves are not new, 
their use is qualitatively different and una-
shamed. Rather than being a utilitarian strat-
egy to increase the size of the armed force or 
reward soldiers, they have now become a tac-
tic of war, not dissimilar to how rape came to 
be recognised as a weapon of war. While the 
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focus of the UNSC resolution seeks to hold 
accountable those who perpetrate these acts, 
more focus is required on protection and 
prevention to stop it from happening.
The use of these practices by violent 
extremist groups is also only one part of the 
problem of human trafficking in conflict, 
but it is the most straightforward for iden-
tifying a response. However, other practices, 
including those set out in the typology above 
also need to be factored into the responses 
of member states. Although they may not 
equate to the same level of exploitation, they 
still represent a violation of human rights and 
deserve equal attention. The challenge is the 
agency of the ‘victim’ means the identifica-
tion of a clear perpetrator undermines strate-
gies that engage at that level. What is needed 
are strategies to protect people on the move, 
to prevent them from being exploited, and to 
undermine the enabling environment that 
encourages people to exploit those that are 
vulnerable.
Notes
 1 Also referred to as Da’esh, this article 
adopts the language used in the UNSC 
Resolution.
 2 Interview, Addis Ababa, August 2016.
 3 In this article, human trafficking is used 
because of the terminology used in the 
Security Council debate and resolution, 
which sparked the content.
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